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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALMA GLENN PRATT, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
UINTAH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 14469 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE ~ 
This is an action for breach of contract arising out of 
Appellant's failure to renew Respondent's contract of employment 
with it. Respondent seeks reinstatement as a teacher with 
Appellant and damages for breach of contract including all rights 
and benefits which he would have received had he not been improperly 
terminated by Appellant. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This action was tried to a jury on December 10, 1975, 
at Vernal, Utah, before the Honorable J* Robert Bullock, Judge. 
By stipulation of the parties, the question presented to the jury 
was whether or not Respondent resigned his position of employment i 
with Appellant. By Special Verdict, the jury found that Respondent 
had not resigned his position of employment. The Court entered 
judgment against Appellant on January 28, 1976 awarding Respondent 
$18,070.03 in damages and further ordered Appellant to reinstate 
Respondent as a teacher together with all rights and benefits he 
would have received had he not been terminated contrary to the 
terms of his contract of employment with Appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the judgment of the District 
Court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent testified that he was employed at the Whiterocks 
School as a school teacher by Appellant for thirteen years from 
1959-1973. (Tt p. 28). At the time of trial, he was 54 years of 
age, married and had three children living at home. (Tr. pp. 26-27). 
He had no other occupation since becoming a school teacher. 
(Tr. p. 30). 
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Respondent testified that he had planned to teach another ten 
years. (Tr. p. 30). 
During March, 1973, the Superintendent of Appellant 
met with Respondent and the other teachers at WhiterocksSchool 
in the Uintah District where the Respondent taught school. 
(Tr. pp. 27, 28 and 78). At that meeting, the Respondent and 
the other teachers were told that the school would be closed at 
the end of the school year and that if any of them desired to 
teach elsewhere, they should submit a letter of application for 
such other position. (Tr. pp. 33-34 and 78). However, Superintendent 
Evans admitted on cross-examination that it was the duty of the 
school district to hire tenured teachers teaching at the Whiterocks 
School in another school in the district. On or about April 1, 
1973, Respondent sent a letter to Appellant requesting a teaching 
position at the Todd Elementary School in the Uintah District. 
(Tr. p. 32, Ex. 1). 
Appellant states that certain events followed 
Respondent's letter requesting another teaching position with the 
District. Essentially, Mr. Ashel Evans, Superintendent of Appellant, 
maintains that Respondent resigned his position of employment at 
a meeting at which only the two of them were present. (See 
Appellant's Brief pp. 3-4). Respondent testified he did not 
resign. (Tr. pp. 35-37). Respondent further testified that 
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Superintendent Evans had advised him that since the District 
closing the WhiterocksSchool, Respondent would have to apply for 
a job. Respondent replied that his position of employment was 
with the District and not just the school. Respondent then testified 
that Mr. Evans advised him: 'Veil, you have tenure at the school 
but not in the District." (Tr. p. 34). Superintendent Evans 
testified on direct examination that in late April or early May, 
1973, Respondent advised him that he was resigning. Respondent 
denied that he ever resigned and the jury believed Respondent. 
Accordingly, this Court should accept the fact that Respondent did 
not resign his position of employment. Toomers Estate v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 121 Utah 37, 239 P.2d 163 (1951); Lym v. 
Thompson,112 Utah 24, 184 P.2d 667 (1947). Nevertheless, 
"Appellant proceeded to fill the vacancy left by Respondent's 
resignation." (Tr. p. 81). 
On June 27, 1973, a letter was sent to Appellant by the 
Uintah Education Association requesting a hearing on behalf of the 
Respondent regarding his termination. On August 14, 1973, a second 
request was made for a hearing regarding the termination of Respondent 
A hearing was held September 5, 1973. (R. p. 145). 
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Superintendent Evans testified that the purpose 
of the hearing was to determine why Respondent had not had his 
contract renewed. (Tr. pp. 85-86). The minutes of the meeting of 
the Board show that when asked when the Board had decided to 
terminate Mr. Pratt, "Superintendent Evans stated that the Board 
had instructed him to advise all teachers at Whiterock that because 
the school was being closed all of their jobs were being terminated." 
Part of the language of a valid contract between 
Respondent and Appellant provides in relevant part: 
Whenever, for any cause, it becomes 
necessary to decrease the number of 
tenured employees in the school district, 
the Board of Education may, at the close 
of the school year, release as many of 
such employees as may be necessary. 
Notice shall be given by the time contracts 
are issued. No tenured employee shall be 
dismissed under the provisions of this 
section while a nontenured emplryee is 
retained or employed to render a service 
which the tenured employee is certificated 
and competent to render. (Emphasis added). 
(R. p. 3). 
The parties stipulated in the Pre-Trial Order that the 
Respondent was a "tenured employee." At trial, counsel for 
Appellant agreed that the Appellant did hire untenured teachers 
to teach positions Respondent was capable of teaching. (Tr. p. 74). 
Superintendent Evans also testified that new teachers were hired 
to teach in the District for the 1973-74 school year. (Tr. p. 91). 
_c_ 
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The sole question submitted to the jury was whether or 
not Respondent had resigned his position of employment with Appellant. 
The jury found that Respondent had not resigned. (R. p. 242), 
Dan Turner, Clerk-Treasurer.of the Uintah County 
School District, testified that he knew the salary and benefits 
Respondent would have received during the years for which 
Respondent claimed damages and that Respondent's salary and 
fringe benefits for 1974 would have been $6,710.71 (Respondent 
waived damages for the 1973 portion of the 1973-74 school year). 
(Tr. p. 98). Mr. Turner testified that Respondent's salary and 
fringe benefits for the 1974-75 school year would have been 
$13,373.84 and that those salary and benefit amounts would have 
been $6,156.09 from the beginning of the 1975-76 school year 
to the date of the trial (December 10, 1975). 
-5-
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Mr. Turner testified that Respondent's total salary and job related 
benefits would have totaled $26,240.50. (Tr. p. 98-99). At no 
time did counsel for Appellant object to the foregoing testimony 
of Mr. Turner. 
Respondent testified that he had sought and taken other 
employment from 1973 through 1975. (Tr. pp. 38-39). He testified 
that his income for 1974 was $3,200.00 as shown by his Federal Tax 
Return, (Tr. p. 38, Ex. 3), and that his 1975 income was $4,970.50 
as shown by his check stubs from his current employer. (Tr. p. 39, 
Ex. 4). 
On cross-examination, counsel for Appellant asked Respondent 
whether or not he had applied for work with the Duchesne School 
District. (Tr. p. 46). Respondent replied that he had. (Tr. pp. 47-
48). Counsel for Appellant did not ask Respondent what had come 
as a result of his application to the Duchesne School District nor 
did counsel pursue whether or not Respondent had made application 
for work elsewhere. With respect to Respondent's employment, the 
record shows as follows: 
-7-
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1 
Q (BY MR. LYBBERT): You are presently employed 
by Turner Lumber, is that what I understand? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And how long have you been employed there? 
A Since January of !75. 
MR. LYBBERT: I have no further questions 
at this time, Your Honor. (Tr. pp. 49-50). 
The only other evidence in the record regarding Appellant's 
contention that damages should have been submitted to the jury 
appears in the testimony of Mr. Nash at Tr, 109 wherein Mr. Nash 
is being asked by Respondent's attorney as to portions of the minutes 
of a meeting of the Board of Education of the Uintah County School 
District held September 5, 1973. Those minutes state in part: 
Mr. Nash asked Mr. Pratt if he was working. 
Mr. Pratt replied that he was working at 
Turner Building Supply at Roosevelt. Mr. 
Nash asked Mr. Pratt if he had applied for 
a teaching position in another district. 
Mr. Pratt stated that he had applied to the 
Duchesne School District. He stated that they 
would only allow him six years teaching experience. 
He stated that this would require him to take 
a loss of income. Mr. Nash stated that the 
measure of damage that might be awarded him 
could be the difference between what he could 
have received with six years experience and 
what he could have received at the top of the 
salary schedule. (Tr. p. 109, Exhibit 12). 
-8-
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The Court held that there was no real issue as to damages 
and that damages were a matter of calculation, "there being no 
factual dispute it's strictly a matter of law" and that there was 
insufficient evidence for the question of mitigation to go to the 
jury. (Tr. p. 130). When asked whether there was any evidence, 
the jury could "fasten on" to reduce the amount of damages claimed 
by Respondent, counsel for Appellant replied: "There aren't dollars 
and cents figures that they can." (Tr. p. 133). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
FOR THE REASON THAT: 
A. THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION 
PROCEDURES ACT, SECTIONS 53-51-1 ET SEQ., 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (SUPP. 1975) RENDERS 
THE PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN THE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT NONAPPLICABLE IN TEACHER 
TERMINATION CASES. 
B. THE UTAH LEGISLATURE AMENDED THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT TO PERMIT 
ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST 
GOVERNMENTAL UNITS WITHOUT COMPLYING 
WITH SECTIONS 63-30-12, 63-30-13 AND 
63-30-19 OF THAT ACT. 
C. THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES 
NOT APPLY TO ACTIONS BROUGHT AGAINST 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
_Q_ 
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A. THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION.PROCEDURES ACT, SECTIONS 
53-51-1 ET SEQ., UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, (SUPP. 1975) RENDERS THE 
PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT NONAPPLICABLE 
IN TEACHER TERMINATION CASES. 
Appellant argues that Respondent waive his claims under 
the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, Sections 53-51-1 
et seq., (Supp. 1975) and cites a portion of the record in support 
of its contention. One June 10, 1974, Appellant had moved the lower 
court to dismiss Plaintiff1s Complaint for the reason, among others, 
that f,Plaintiff had failed to file Notice of his Claim in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 63-30-13, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.!! 
On November 19, 1975, the District Court ruled, !,The Court is of 
the opinion that the Governmental Immunity Act is not applicable 
to this case, and upon that basis, Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment is denied.M (R. p. 186). 
As is more fully set forth below, the Utah Orderly School 
Termination Procedures Act sets forth an administrative procedure 
for terminating teachers which, Respondent submits supersedes the 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
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The school district complied with the procedural aspects of 
the Act in terminating Respondent when it granted him the hearing he 
requested. Accordingly, when counsel for Appellant asked whether or no1 
Respondent was making a claim under the provisions of the Utah Orderly 
School Termination Procedures Act, counsel for Respondent replied 
he was not. (Tr. p. 2). Respondents position is correct for two 
reasons. First, the question of whether or not the Utah Orderly 
School Termination Procedures Act modifies the provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act with respect to Respondent's claim 
is a matter for the court to decide. The court had decided against 
Appellant's position. Therefore, the question as to the applicability 
of the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act was not relevant 
to the jury trial. Second, the Appellant complied with the 
procedural requirements of the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act. Therefore, Respondent submits that his withdrawal 
of his claim under the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures 
Act was only for the purpose of the trial then scheduled. To the 
extent the Act waived the application of the Governmental Immunity 
Act, Respondent submits that his claim under the Utah Orderly 
School Termination Procedures Act is still relevant. Even if 
Respondent did error in withdrawing his claim, it is a harmless error. 
The question of whether or not the Act applied is for the Court to 
decide and therefore had no effect on the jury trial. 
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It is Respondent's position that the Utah Orderly School 
Termination Procedures Act sets forth certain administrative remedies 
inconsistent with the notice requirement of Section 63-30-12 of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Section 53-51-4 of the Utah 
Orderly School Termination Procedures Act requires in part that the: 
• . . board of education of each school 
district by contract with its educators 
or their associations or by resolution of 
the board shall establish procedures for 
termination of educators in an orderly 
manner without discrimination. 
Section 53-51-5, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1975), provides 
that the orderly school termination procedures adopted by the district: 
shall provide: 
(1) a right to a fair hearing. 
ickick 
(4) at least one month prior to issuing 
notice of intent not to renew the contract 
of the individual, he shall be informed of 
the fact that continued employment is in 
question and the reasons therefor and given 
an opportunity to correct the defect which 
precipitated possible nonrenewal. 
(5) a written statement of causes 
(a) pursuant to which the contract of 
individuals may not be renewed . . . . 
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Sections 53-51-6 and 53-51-7 of the Utah Code set forth 
the procedures pursuant to which the "fair hearing" is to be 
conducted and specifically authorizes boards of education to 
establish procedures for conducting "fair hearings." 
Appellant argues that on or about March 23, 1973, 
Superintendent Evans met with Respondent and other teachers at the 
Whiterocks School and advised them that the School would be closed 
"at the end of the school year and that if any of them desired to 
teach elsewhere in the District, they should inform the Appellant 
of their intent in writing." (Tr. p. 78). 
Respondent submits that the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act supersedes and renders not applicable those provisions 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which provide for the filing 
of a claim before suit may be brought against the school district 
for the reason that the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures 
Act specifically requires that school districts adopt procedures and 
afford teachers employed by them specific procedural rights and 
remedies which are different than those contemplated in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
-13-
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For example, the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures 
Act gives a teacher certain rights in the nature of job security 
and provides "procedural due proces^1for any teacher seeking redress 
for violation of the provisions of that Act. Specifically, the Act 
requires that the school district afford teachers a "fair hearing11 
(Section 53-51-5(1)) and further provides that school districts shall 
provide teachers with "written notice of suspension or final 
termination including findings of fact made by the board when such 
suspension or termination is for cause" (Section 53-51-5(9)). The 
Act further specifies the procedure pursuant to which the hearing 
shall be conducted (Section 53-51-6) and provides that hearing 
examiners may be appointed by the school district to conduct hearings 
involving the termination of teachers (Section 53-51-7). 
It is clear that the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act requires that the school district establish procedures 
and a timetable for hearing disputes involving the termination of 
teachers. 
-14-
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Considerable latitude is allowed school boards in 
establishing those procedures. In the instant case, it is difficult 
to determine preciseLy when Respondents "claim" occurred. Appellant 
could argue that Respondents claim occurred on March 23, 1973, 
when Superintendent Evans advised the teachers at Whiterocks that 
they would have to apply for other employment in the District. 
Respondent's claim could have also occurred in late March or early 
May of 1973 (when Superintendent Evans states that Respondent resigned) 
or that it occurred when "Appellant proceeded to fill the vacancy 
left by Respondents resignation." 
Respondent submits that the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act specifically authorizes the school board to establish 
procedures for conducting a "fair hearing." Whatever may be the 
date on which Respondents "claim" occurred, Appellant set the date 
for Respondent's "fair hearing" at a time considerably after the 
ninety day period permitted by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
which Appellant urges on this Court. By its own action, the school 
board may defeat the legitimate claim of a tenured school teacher 
by delaying an administrative remedy under the Utah Orderly School 
Termination Procedures Act beyond the 90 day filing period provided 
in the Governmental Immunity Act. 
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Furthermore, Section 53-51-7, Utah Code Annotated, 
(Supp. 1975) provides in part: 
. . . nothing herein shall be construed 
to limit the right of either the board 
or the educator to appeal to an appropriate 
court of law. 
Respondent submits that the procedures set forth in the 
Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act are clearly inconsistent 
with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and would allow school boards 
to defeat the intention of the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act by delaying the nfair hearing11 until long after the 
ninety day period afforded in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
had run. 
Respondent further submits that the principal purpose 
of the requirement that claims be presented or filed within a short 
period of time is to provide units of government with full information 
as to the rights asserted against it and to enable the local unit of 
government to make proper investigation concerning the merit of the 
claim and to settle those claims having merit without the expense of 
litigation. 17 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Section 48.02 
at page 60. 
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Statutory . . . provisions requiring 
presentation of claims or demands to 
municipal corporations or counties 
before an action is instituted are in 
furtherance of the public policy to 
prevent needless litigation and to save 
unnecessary expenses and costs by affording 
an opportunity amicably to adjust all 
claims before suit is brought. The purpose 
of provisions requiring notice or statements 
of claims as a condition precedent to 
instituting a suit for damage against a 
municipal corporation is to give municipal 
authorities prompt notice of the injury 
and the surrounding circumstances in order 
that the matter may be investigated while 
the matter is fresh, witnesses available, 
and before conditions have changed materially, 
and that the liability of the municipality 
or the extent of liability may be determined. 
56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, g 686, 
citing cases including Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 
43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1169 (1913), 52 ALR 2d 966. 
In the instant case, the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act specifically reverses the requirements set forth in 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in that a school district which 
terminates r,a tenured teacher" must give notice to the teacher of 
its intention to terminate him together with the specific reasons 
therefor. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires that the 
injured party state with specificity the basis upon which he asserts 
a claim against the governmental entity. 
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Respondent submits that procedural provisions of the 
Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act are inconsistent with 
the procedures of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act was enacted in 1965 by the Utah Legislature. 
The Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act was enacted by 
the Utah Legislature in 1973. The later act affording rights and 
requiring procedures different than the earlier act necessarily 
prevails over the earlier act. West Beverage Co. of Provo v. 
Hansen, 98 Utah 332, 96 P.2d 1105 (1940). 
Where two legislative acts are repugnant to, or in 
conflict with each other, the last one passed, being the latest 
expression of the legislative will, will, although it contains 
no repealing provisions, govern, control or prevail so as to 
supersede and repeal the earlier act to the extent of the repugnancy. 
Bullenv. Anderson, 81 Utah 151, 17 P.2d 213 (1932); 82 CJS, Statutes, 
Section 294, p. 489. If the enforcement of an earlier statute 
would thwart the purposes of a later one, the courts will resort 
to the doctrine of repeal by implication. State ex rel. Medford and 
Pear Co. v. Fowler, 207 Ore. 182, 295 P.2d 167 (1955). 
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B. THE UTAH LEGISLATURE AMENDED THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
TO PERMIT ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL 
UNITS WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 63-30-12, 63-30-13 AND 
63-30-19 OF THAT ACT. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act at Section 63-30-5, 
Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1975) provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived as to any contractual 
obligation and actions arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations shall 
not be subject to the requirements of 
sections 63-30-12, 63-30-13 or 63-30-19 
of this act. (1975 Amendment underlined). 
The 1975 Session of the Utah Legislature specifically 
permitted actions against governmental entities arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations to be brought without the filing 
of a notice of claim. 
Respondent submits that the action of the 1975 Legislature 
is relevant to his case even though his claim occurred some time 
during 1973. The amendment to the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act was a remedial statute relating only to the procedure by 
which Respondent could secure his rights under the Utah Orderly 
School Termination Procedures Act. As such, the amendment may 
properly be construed to operate retrospectively and applies 
to this action. 
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. . . remedial or procedural statutes 
which do not create, enlarge, diminish, 
or destroy contractual or vested rights 
but relate only to remedies or modes of 
procedure are not within the general 
rule against retrospective operation but 
are generally held to operate retro-
spectively. Such statutes will not be 
given retrospective operation if to do 
so would impair contractual obligation 
or severe vested rights, unless the 
language of the statute indicates that 
such is the legislative intent. 
While it has been held that a remedial 
statute will not be given retrospective 
or retroactive operation unless the 
legislative intent appears on the face 
of the statute, expressly, by plain and 
positive language, or by necessary 
implication, the rule that, unless the 
language of the statute so requires, the 
statute shoudd not be given retrospective 
or retroactive operation has been held 
not to apply to purely remedial laws, 
unless an intent to the contrary is shown; 
and a remedial statute is to be construed 
to give affect to the purpose for which it 
was enacted, and, the reason of the statute 
extends to the past transactions as well as 
those in the future, it will be so applied, 
although it does not, in terms, so direct, 
unless to do so would impair some vested 
right or violate some constitutional guarantee. 
82 CJS Statutes, § 614;(see also 82 CJS Statutes, 
§ 421. 
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It is the general rule that provisions added by 
amendment affecting substantive rights are intended to operate 
prospectively only and that provisions added by amendment affecting 
substantive rights will not operate retrospectively unless the 
legislature has expressly stated its intent or such intent is 
fairly implied by the language of the amendment or by the 
circumstances surrounding its enactment that the amendment operate 
retrospectively. McCarrey v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 
111 Utah 251, 177 P.2d 725 (1947); Oakland Construction Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (1974); Sands, Sutherland 
Statutory Construction, p. 200, Section 22.36 (4th Ed.). 
However, in the absence of a savings clause, or statute 
or some other clear indication that the legislative intent is to 
the contrary, provisions added by amendment which affect procedural 
rights or legal remedies are construed to apply to all cases pending 
at the time of its enactment and all those commenced subsequent 
thereto, whether the substantive rights sought to be enforced 
thereby accrued prior or subsequent to the amendment unless a vested 
right would be thereby impaired. Sands, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction, p. 200, Section 22.36 (4th Ed.). 
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The construction of remedial statutes requires great 
liberality and whenever meaning is doubtful, it should be construed 
to extend the remedy. Contractual Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Construction 
Co., 46 C.2d 423, 296 P.2d 108, 51 ALR2d 914 (1956). 
In Tellier v. Edwards, 56 Wash.2d 652, 354 P.2d 925 (1960), < 
the court held that a remedial statute has retroactive application 
when it relates to practice, procedure or remedies and does not 
affect a substantive or vested right. Accord, Beneficial Management 
Corp. of America, 85 Wash.2d 637, 583 P.2d 510 (1957). 
Respondent submits that the filing of a notice required 
in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is merely jurisdictional 
barring the court from considering actions against the State and 
its political subdivisions. As the notice requirement no longer 
applies to actions arising out of contract, the bar to the 
jurisdiction of the court has been waived by the Legislature. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the cause of action arose before 
the subject amendment to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the 
lower court had jurisdiction to hear this action even though 
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Respondent did not file the notice, because the action arose out of 
a breach of contract. 
Although there is authority to the contrary, 
Respondent submits: 
• . . where clearly intended, or in the 
absence of an intent to the contrary, 
a statute conferring jurisdiction may 
operate to give jurisdiction over causes 
of action arising before the passage of 
the act. 82 CJS, Statutes, Section 423« 
C. THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO ACTIONS 
BROUGHT AGAINST SCHOOL DISTRICTS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
This cause of action against the 
Appellant is not governed by the language of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. Section 63-30-2(5) defines "claim" as: 
. . • any claim brought against a 
governmental entity or its employees 
as permitted by this Act. (Emphasis added) • 
Section 53-4-8, Utah Code Annotated, (1953), found in 
the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, provides in relevant part: 
Said boards (of education) . . . may 
sue and be sued . . . . 
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It is clear from the language of Section 53-4-8 that, 
if Respondent ever had governmental immunity, such immunity was 
waived in 1898 and not in 1965 when the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act became effective. 
Section 53-4-8 specifically authorized suits against 
Appellant. Accordingly, Respondent's action for breach of contract 
against the Appellant is not governed by the provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
For any of the foregoing reasons, Respondent need not 
comply with the notice requirement of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY ORDERED 
APPELLANT TO PAY DAMAGES AND TO 
REINSTATE RESPONDENT IN ITS EMPLOYMENT. 
In this cause of action, Respondent sought both damages 
and reinstatement. Appellant does not question the authority of the 
court to award damages (if the action is properly before the court), 
but does question the propriety of the court ordering Respondent 
reinstated. An affirmative injunction ordering a party to perform 
under the provisions of a contract will be treated as an order of 
specific performance. Specific performance of a contract will be 
given as a substitute for the remedy of damages where the legal 
remedy is inadequate or impractical. Specific performance will be 
ordered to prevent the travesty of justice involved in permitting 
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parties to refuse the performance of their contracts at their 
pleasure while electing to pay adequate damages for the breach. 
71 AmJur 2d, Specific Performance, Section 1. 
In order to grant a prayer for specific performance of 
a contract, the remedy afforded at law must be as plain, adequate, 
competent and efficient as the remedy of specific performance and 
not insufficient or doubtful. Halloran-Judge Trust Co. v. Heath, 
70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342 (1927), 64 ALR 368. 
Appellant argues that Respondent had an adequate remedy 
at law for the prospective breach of his employment contract with 
Appellant and that Appellant is therefore precluded from injunctive 
relief. Respondent submits that he had no adequate remedy for 
prospective breach for the reason that his claim to such damages 
would have been speculative and uncertain. B.T. Moran v. First 
Security Corp., 82 Utah2d 316, 24 P.2d 384 (1933). 
Counsel for Appellant admitted that there were no dollar 
and cent figures in this case. (Tr. p. 133). Furthermore, Appellant's 
reliance on the Ha11oran case, supra, is not well founded. In 
Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P. 2d 930 (1938), 
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reh. den. 96 Utah 104, 85 P.2d (1938), Genola sought an order of the 
court compelling Santaquin to provide it with water pursuant to the 
terms of a written agreement. One of the terms of the written 
agreement conditioned Santaquin1s performance upon receiving federal 
funds to assist in the construction of the project. Santaquin argued 
that the contract was not enforceable for want of mutuality for the 
reason that it, at its sole discretion, could have defeated the 
contract by not applying for federal funds. The court held at 
96 Utah 96-97: 
Such is the case with many contracts whose 
binding effect depends on a condition 
precedent, the carrying out of which 
condition precedent lies within the power 
of only one of the parties to the contract. 
Th rule regarding mutuality of obligation 
as making the contract amenable to specific 
performance is more honored by 
than by obedience to the rule. The doctrine 
of mutuality has gone through the course 
of most legal developments. Great legal 
minds have fashioned the law from the staff 
of life by applying a solution which fits 
the justice of the actual case. • . . 
The old doctrine of mutuality of remedy is 
a concrete example of a rule which has been 
so eroded by necessary exceptions as to leave 
it more of a vestige than a substantiality. 
/> s\ /\ /\ 
Specific performance is granted by equity 
when it is plain that the party should 
and can perform and refuses to do so, an 
injustice not remedial by a monetary judgment 
would otherwise result. The doctrine that 
at the time of making the contract there must 
be mutual fixed obligations is not tenable. 
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If the contract itself provides for a 
preliminary period definite or indefinite 
in which it is to be determined whether 
a condition precedent which will make the 
contract binding will take place and before 
withdrawal of the obligor of the contract, 
it becomes bilateral by performance of the 
condition precedent, equity may under the 
rule above laid down decrease specific 
performance in order to do justice or 
prevent injustice, as if the contract from 
the beginning had been bilateral. 
In Utah Mercur Gold Mining Co. v. Herschel Gold Mining Co., 
103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094 (1943), the defendants argued that 
plaintiff's prayer for specific performance should not be granted 
because the plaintiff had refused to per&rm under the provisions 
of the agreement and the court did not compel them to do so. The 
court held at 301 Utah 255-256: 
We see no merit in the court refusing to 
grant specific performance to the petitioner 
where he has performed his part simply 
because the respondent might not or could 
not obtain his specific performance if the 
shoe had been on the other foot. It is 
very difficult to see why a person who 
refuses to perform where the other has 
performed may stand up in court and say: 
"even though he has done what the contract 
required of him and I have not, you should 
not make me perform because if he had not 
performed and I had performed or tendered 
performance, I could not obtain the remedy 
of specific performance." The remedy of one 
should not depend upon the hypothetical case 
of what the other could demand if the situation 
were different. 
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In the instant case, Respondent tendered his offer to 
perform at the Todd School. In reliance upon his contract of 
employment with Appellant, he stood ready to perform. Appellant 
cites 22 ALR2d 508 in support of the proposition that mutuality 
of remedy is essential to granting specific performance. Respondent 
submits that 22 ALR2d 508 may be cited on any proposition regarding 
the doctrine of mutuality of remedy for the reason that the purpose 
of the citation is: 
. . . to examine in this annotation 
the history and the juridical basis 
of the mutuality rule in general, 
note the principal authorities 
concerning it, suggest the proper 
form of it, and review the general 
case law and substance of the whole 
subject. 
Respondent submits that review of the cases cited in 
22 ALR2d 508 and the cases cited subsequent thereto clearly 
demonstrate a movement by the courts away from the requirement of 
mutuality before specific performance will be ordered by the courts. 
Appellant cites Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 5A, §1204 
(1951 and supplement), to advance three reasons why specific 
performance should not be ordered. 
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The first argument is that the decree would be difficult 
to enforce. That would be true only if the court were ordering 
Respondent to perform in a workmanlike manner or to the best of 
his abilities. In the instant case, the court is merely ordering 
Appellant to reinstate Respondent as a school teacher. This is 
not an action which would require the continuous supervision of 
the Court. In the instant case, Respondent seeks an order of this 
Court ordering Appellant to reinstate him as a teacher employed by 
Appellant. If, in the future, Appellant has grounds to terminate 
Respondent, it may so do. 
Second, Appellant suggests that involuntary servitude 
is somehow involved in this matter. Involuntary servitude would 
be involved if the Court were being asked to order Respondent to 
render a service. In this instance, Respondent has asked the Court 
to order the Appellant to re-employ him. If, it is Appellant's 
contention that it is being placed in a position of ,finvoluntary 
servitude" because of the Court's order requiring it to reinstate 
Respondent, the argument is inapplicable as the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting "involuntary 
servitude" applies only to natural individuals, and not to political 
subdivisions. 
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Third, Appellant argues that it fosters a "continuing 
undesirable relationship between employer and employee." In this 
case, Appellant has never argued that there was an undesirable 
relationship. Appellant has maintained that Respondent quit his 
position. The jury did not believe Appellant. If an "undesirable 
relationship" exists, it is because of the manner in which Appellant 
has treated Respondent. Appellant should not be able to assert 
its own wrongdoing as a basis for refusing to re-employ Respondent. 
In School District No. 6 of Pima County v. Barber, 85 
Ariz. 95, 332 P.2d 496 (195 8), the court held that a teacher whose 
contract of employment would have automatically been renewed unless 
a written notice of dismissal was given on or before a certain date, 
and that notice was not given, was entitled to reinstatement. 
In Matteson v. State Board of Education, 57 C.A.2d 991, 
136 P.2d 120 (1943), the court held that where the state commission 
on credentials illegaly refused to renew the credentials of a school 
teacher, and the local board acted illegaly in dismissing the teacher, 
the teacher was entitled to be restored to her position with full 
salary from the date of dismissal. 
In Mass v. Board of Education of San Francisco Unified 
School District, 61 C.2d 612, 394 P.2d 579 (1964), the court held 
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that a teacher is entitled to reinstatement with full salary and 
benefits from the date of suspension where the local board of 
education suspended the teacher on charges which the local board 
failed to establish. 
In Thayer v. Anacortes School District, 81 Wash.2d 709, 
504 P.2d 1130 (1972), it concerned the nonrenewal of a teacher/librariai 
whose contract with the school district was not renewed allegedly 
because of a lack of funds necessitating a reduction in certificated 
personnel. The teacher was the senior librarian. The court held 
that the teacher would be entitled to reinstatement and reasonable 
damages if she could show that librarians with less seniority were 
retained. Accord, Lines v. Yakima Public School System, Yakima 
School District No. 7, 533 P.2d 104 (Wash. App. 1975). 
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The foregoing cases cited by Respondent hold that 
reinstatement is a proper remedy where there is a violation of 
a statutory right or a contractual right. Were reinstatement not 
a proper remedy for the Respondent, the statutory requirements of 
the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act could be 
effectively avoided by any school district. For example, a school 
district could notify a teacher during February or March of any 
year that the teacher was to be terminated. A hearing could be 
held on or before June of the same year. Thereafter, the teacher 
would have to resort to court action. If the court hearing were 
held prior to the commencement of the following school year, the 
school teacherTs sole remedy would be for a prospective lost 
salary. Under those circumstances, it is difficult to imagine how 
the injured school teacher would satisfy the trier of fact that 
his monetary damages would be substantial. Were reinstatement 
not afforded school teachers whose statutory rights have been 
violated, provisions of the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures 
Act could be effectively nullified by school district action. 
-32-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
THE EXISTENCE OF RESPONDENT'S CONTRACT 
OF EMPLOYMENT AND ITS TERMS WERE AGREED 
BY THE PARTIES. 
Appellant claims that the "contract language relating 
to preference status in hiring was never received as evidence and 
was thus never available for the judge or jury to consider. 
(Tr. pp. 58, 114). During the trial, counsel for Respondent 
asked Mr. Turner, Clerk-Treasurer of Appellant, to identify what 
was offered as Exhibit 11. Counsel for Appellant objected in the 
following language; 
MR. LYBBERT: I will not stipulate to this, Your Honor, 
because I have not seen the manner in which this 
is formulated and they are comparing it with that. 
And perhaps at recess we can get copies of that and 
submit it. 
MR. DIBBLEE: All right. Excellent. 
THE COURT: All right. Wefll reserve a ruling on your 
offer until he's had an opportunity to examine it 
further. (Tr. p. 58). 
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Apparently, counsel for Respondent felt no obligation 
to examine it further and the record shows that Exhibit 11 was not 
offered during the course of trial. However, after the jury was 
excused, counsel for Appellant argued that the case should be 
dismissed as to Appellant for the reason that Respondent had failed < 
to show he had a contract. (Tr. pp. 134, 136). 
Appellant's entire defense at trial was that Respondent 
had voluntarily resigned and that therefore the district had no 
contractual obligation to rehire the Respondent in succeeding years. 
At page 74 of the Transcript, counsel for Respondent is asking 
Dale Harrison, Principal at the Whiterocks School at the time the 
Appellant failed to renew Respondents contract of employment about 
the number of years teachers had been employed at Whiterocks. At 
that point, the record shows as follows: 
MR. LYBBERT: If Your Honor please, I think this is immaterial. 
I don't think there's any issue in this. 
MR. DIBBLEE: Well, do you admit then that the school did 
hire non-tenured personnel in jobs that Mr. Pratt would 
have been qualified to do. 
MR. LYBBERT: Absolutely. 
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THE COURT: I think that is so. The record will show, 
Ladies and Gent lenient, that there isnft any question 
now, counsel have stipulated and agreed that the School 
District did hire untenured people after his employment 
ended that Mr. Pratt was capable of performing. There 
isn't any question about that. (Tr. p. 74). 
Moreover, counsel for Appellant in his opening statement 
to the jury stated as follows: 
I agree with Mr. Dibblee that this is 
not a complicated case. As I see it, 
the essential issue is whether or not 
Mr. Pratt advised Mr. Evans in the spring 
of '73 that he didn't wish to have his 
contract renewed with the district. 
That's the case. (Tr. p. 22). 
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Counsel for Appellant did not object to the court's 
summary of counsel1s stipulation. When a party concedes a fact, 
< 
declares or stipulates to the existence of a fact material to 
the cause of his adversary, no proof is thereafter required. 
Butler v. Stratton, 95 C.A.2d 23, 212 P.2d 43 (1949). A party 
who causes the court to understand that certain facts are admitted 
cannot object to the hearing being conducted on the basis of that 
understanding. Sundgren v. Sundgren, 363 P.2d 853 (Okla. 1961); 
88 CJS, Trials, Section 58, Evidence need not be introduced to prove 
a fact admitted by the adverse party or conceded by the adverse 
party. 88 CJS, Trials, Section 58. 
Where the party not having the burden of proof admits by 
counsel in open court, the facts on which the claim of the opposing 
party rests, such judicial admission releases the party having the 
burden of proof from aducing evidence to prove such facts and bars 
the opposing party from disputing them and the party having the 
burden of proof is entitled to instructions directing the jury to 
take the admitted facts as positively settled. Hogsett v. Smith, 
229 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. App. 1950). 
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Where a party admits in open court the existence of a 
fact material to the cause of the adversary, no proof is thereafter 
required for a finding on the matter so confessed, and a party who 
causes a judge to understand that certain facts are admitted cannot 
object to the judge's conducting the trial on the basis of that 
understanding. 88 CJS, Trial, Section 58. 
Respondent submits that counsel for Appellant did not 
keep his representation to the Court that he would examine Respondent's 
Exhibit 11 and Mat recess . . . get copies of that and submit it." 
AppellantTs brief at page 2 concedes that "Respondent is a tenured 
school teacher . . . .rf Appellant1s brief sets forth in some 
detail its side of the case arguing that Respondent had resigned. 
The jury did not believe Appellant's evidence, and instead chose 
to believe the evidence presented by Respondent. Appellant tried 
the case on the theory that it need not honor the provisions of 
its contract of employment with Respondent for the reason that 
Respondent had resigned his position of employment. Appellant 
should not now be allowed to assert error based upon its failure 
to keep its representations to the Court regarding the provisions 
of the contract or because it mislead the Court as to whether or 
not the provisions of the contract were still an issue. 
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POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES SHOULD BE 
COMPUTED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Point III of Appellant!s Brief advances the novel 
proposition that not only is it the duty of a party claiming 
damages to show the amount of damages suffered by him, but it is 
also his duty "to show that he has made a reasonable effort to 
seek other remunerative employment and mitigate his damages.11 
(Tr. p. 149). Appellant correctly cites Kartchner v. Home, 
1 Utah 2d 112, 262 P. 2d 749 (1953), for the proposition that it 
is the Respondent's burden to produce evidence showing his damages. 
In the instant case, Respondent testified that he had sought and 
had obtained employment with Turner Lumber Company. He testified 
as to his salary and produced his tax returns for the 1974 tax 
year and further produced his check stubs from his employer for 
the 1975 tax year. Thereafter, Mr. Turner, Clerk-Treasurer of 
Appellant, was called and testified as to the salary and benefits 
Respondent would have received had he continued his employment with 
Appellant. Counsel for Appellant did not cross-examine Respondent 
with respect to his efforts to find employment and concludes in his 
statement of facts, "In the summer of 1973, the Respondent applied 
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for a teaching position with the Duchesne County School District. 
(Tr. pp. 46, 47). Apparently, Respondent was not given an offer 
of employment by the Duchesne District . . . ." (Appellantfs Brief p.4 
Having failed to cross-examine Respondent, Appellant now argues 
the novel proposition that it "was not required to present rebuttal 
or to cross-examine the witnesses in this respect.,f (Appellant's 
Brief p.' 19). Apparently, Appellant urges this Court to adopt the 
rule that it is the burden of the Respondent to show he attempted 
to mitigate his damages. 
Generally speaking, the party who would lose if no 
evidence were presented as to an issue regarding damages is charged 
with the burden of proving that issue. 22 Am Jur2d, Damages, 
Section 291. Where the Appellant asserts matters in reduction 
or mitigation of Respondent's claim or asserts matters which defeat 
a part of the damages claimed, the burden of proving such 
is on the Appellant. Mikol v. Vlahopoulas, 86 Ariz. 93, 340 P.2d 
1000 (1959); Mass v. Board of Education of San Francisco Unified 
School District, 61 C.2d 612, 394 P.2d 579 (1964); Powell v. Brady, 
30 Colo. App. 406, 496 P.2d 328 (1972); Burr v. Clark, 30 Wash.2d 
149, 90 P.2d 769 (1948); Coble v. Osman, 83 Nev. 415, 433 P.2d 
259 (1967); State ex rel Freeman v. Sierra County Board of Education, 
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49 N#M. 54, 157 P.2d 234 (1945); Pearson v. Sigmund, 503 P.2d 702, 
(Ore. 1972). 
Appellant implicitly argues that the question of damages 
is a matter for the jury to decide. Respondent concedes that the 
amount of damages is ordinarily a question for the jury to decide. 
However, where the question of damages is not in dispute and there 
is no more than one reasonable inference that may be drawn therefrom, 
damages become a question of law for the court to decide. 25A CJS, 
Damages, Section 176(1). Having failed to pursue the question of 
mitigation of damages, Respondent submits that there were no contested 
facts as to the amount of damages which Respondent was entitled, 
recover. Therefore, the court correctly determined that the amount 
of Respondents damages should be computed by the court. 
Where facts are not in dispute and no more than one reasonable 
inference may be drawn therefrom, a question of law for the Court 
is presented. Eklund v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 89 Utah 273, 
57 P.2d 362 (1933); Wilcox v. Clouad, 88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1 (1936); 
See Roylance v. Davies, 18 Utah 2d 395, 424 P.2d 142 (1967). 
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CONCLUSION 
A. The restrictive provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act do not apply to actions brought against the state or 
political subdivisions arising out of contract nor do those 
provisions apply in the case of termination of tenured teachers* 
B. The Respondent is entitled to monetary damages and 
an order reinstating him as a school teacher, 
C. The language of Respondent's contract of employment 
with Appellant was not an issue as counsel for Appellant conceded 
the point in his representations to the jury and to the Court. 
D. The lower court correctly decided that the question 
of damages was a question for the court to determine as there was 
no dispute regarding the amount of damages suffered by Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MICHAEL T. McCOY and 
A. M. FERRO 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
414 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-2408 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to counsel for Appellant, 
Merlin R. Lybbert, 700 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101, this day of June, 1976. 
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